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ALLOWING FOR GREATER LENIENCY
IN THE APPELLATE PROCESS:
HOW STATE V. HART BOTH CLARIFIED AND
EXPANDED THE USE OF RULE 2 OF THE NORTH
CAROLINA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE
FOLLOWING THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN
VIAR V. NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT
OF TRANSPORTATION
ROBERT JORDAN MCCARTER

"It is, therefore, necessary to have rules of procedure and to adhere to
them, and if we relax them in favor of one, we might as well abolish
them. "'
INTRODUCTION

The North Carolina Supreme Court's recent decision in State v.
Hart2 both expanded and clarified the Court's vague opinion from
Viar v. North CarolinaDepartment of Transportation3 made two years
prior, concerning an appellate court's application of Rule 2 of the
North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure (Rule[s]). 4 While the
Hart opinion has delineated certain problematic aspects of the Viar
holding, there still remain unresolved issues that the Court of Appeals
has attempted to address, yet has not done so with the unanimity ex1. Bradshaw v. Stansberry, 164 N.C. 356, 79 S.E. 302 (1913).
2. State v. Hart, 361 N.C. 309, 644 S.E.2d 201 (2007) (Opinion discussing whether the
majority opinion at the Court of Appeals correctly used the Viar case when affirming the trial
court's guilty verdict because the assignments of error in the appellant's brief did not adhere to
the Rules. The Supreme Court explained that the Appellate Court failed to properly inquire
into its use of Rule 2, and therefore, remanded the case in part for further inquiry into whether
Rule 2 should be invoked.), rev'd, 179 N.C. App. 30, 633 S.E.2d 102 (2006).
3. Viar v. N.C. Dep't of Transp., 359 N.C. 400, 610 S.E.2d 360 (2005) (per curiam) (discussing whether the Court of Appeals majority was correct in overturning a decision of the Industrial
Commission which denied a tort claim against the State. In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme
Court adopted the dissenting opinion at the Court of Appeals, thereby dismissing the tort claim
against the State.), rev'd, 162 N.C. App. 362, 590 S.E.2d 909 (2004).
4. N.C. R. App. P. 2 (2007) ("To prevent manifest injustice to a party, or to expedite decision in the public interest, either court of the appellate division may, except as otherwise expressly provided by these rules, suspend or vary the requirements or provisions of any of these
rules in a case pending before it upon application of a party or upon its own initiative, and may
order proceedings in accordance with its directions.").
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pected from Hart.5 In North Carolina, an appeal to the Supreme
Court is a right guaranteed to the appellants in any case in which the
Court of Appeals issues a dissenting opinion; therefore, because of the
dissent filed by Judge Hunter in Dogwood, that court's analysis of
Hart would once again place Rule 2 before the North Carolina Supreme Court.6

First, and most importantly, Hart does not presume to allow all
Rule irregularities to be safeguarded by Rule 2, but it is intended to
clear up the uncertainty from Viar, while still employing restrictive
measures to the application of Rule 2 so it does not become a fall back
for practitioners who habitually or negligently violate the rules. The
worn-out clich6 that the rules are the rules, and they are made not to
be broken still rings true for violations following Hart; however, the
Court's opinion acknowledges that minor technical violations should
not preclude hearing an appellant's appeal on the merits when a
"manifest injustice" would occur to that party, or "to expedite decision in the public interest."7 By recognizing that Rule 2 continues
serving a legitimate purpose in North Carolina's appellate process, the
Court correctly overturned the Court of Appeals' majority opinion,
which dismissed the case for failure to comply with the Rules, thereby
allowing the appeal to be heard.8
Though the Court has not revisited Hart, it appears the Court will
need to do so in order to further clarify the parameters of Rule 2. This
note will initially focus on Justice Hudson's opinion in Hart along with
an analysis of that opinion so that future cases may be decided in the
same manner. Furthermore, the note will examine the background
surrounding Rule 2 with a special emphasis on its application prior to
and then after the Viar holding. It is necessary to understand the prior
case law on this matter when reviewing Hart, so the proverbial dots
may be connected. In conclusion, the note will consider the possible
ramifications of using the Hart analysis in the future, along with suggestions for improvement in the area.

5. See Dogwood Dev. & Mgmt. Co., LLC v. White Oak Transp. Co., 645 S.E.2d 212 (N.C.
Ct. App. 2007) (Hunter, J., dissenting) (Justice Tyson, who wrote the Court of Appeals' dissenting opinion in Viar, which was ultimately adopted by the Supreme Court, authored the majority
opinion in this case using the Hart analysis, while Justice Hunter dissented imploring the Court
of Appeals to take an alternative view on rule violations.).
6. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-30(2) (2005) ("Except as provided in G.S. 7A-28, an appeal lies
of right to the Supreme Court from any decision of the Court of Appeals rendered in a case ...
[i]n which there is a dissent.").
7. N.C. R. APP. P. 2.
8. State v. Hart, 179 N.C. APP. 30, 633 S.E.2d 102 (2006) (2-1 decision) (Hunter, J. dissenting), affd in part, rev'd in part, 361 N.C. 309, 644 S.E.2d 201 (2007).
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THE CASE

On May 13, 2005, after a jury trial, the defendant-appellant, Elgin
Orlandas Hart, was convicted "for possession with intent to sell and
deliver cocaine, keeping and maintaining a dwelling for the use of cocaine, and possession of marijuana."9 Following these convictions,
Hart then "pleaded guilty to being an habitual felon."' 10 After sentencing, the defendant filed his appeal with the Court of Appeals, which
issued its divided opinion on August 1, 2006.11 Because "the dissenting
opinion only addressed the majority's decision to dismiss one of the
defendant's arguments for violations of the Rules of Appellate Procedure," the Supreme Court addressed only the disputed issue in its
opinion, which is the focus of this note.12
On its face, the assignment of error in controversy concerned
whether a police officer's testimony that "a razor blade taped to cardboard and seized near defendant was a crack pipe," violated evidentiary rules. 3 Although the defendant assigned error to this testimony,
the majority at the Court of Appeals held that the particular assignment violated Rule 10(c)(1) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure,14
and therefore, "the court did not address the merits of this argument."' 5 Specifically, the majority wrote that the "defendant's assignment of error asserting that the police officer's testimony 'otherwise
violated the N.C. Rules of Evidence would allow defense counsel to
argue on appeal any and every violation of the North Carolina Rules
of Evidence."" 6
On the other hand, Judge Hunter's dissent argued the assignment
was not technically deficient, but even if a deficiency existed, it should
not prohibit the court from hearing the appeal on its merits when
Rule 2 could be invoked at the court's discretion.' 7 The dissent stated
9. Hart, 644 S.E.2d at 201.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 201-02.
12. Id. at 202.
13. Id.
14. N.C. R. App. P. 10(c)(1) ("Form; Record References. A listing of the assignments of
error upon which an appeal is predicated shall be stated at the conclusion of the record on
appeal, in short form without argument, and shall be separately numbered. Each assignment of
error shall, so far as practicable, be confined to a single issue of law; and shall state plainly,
concisely and without argumentation the legal basis upon which error is assigned. An assignment
of error is sufficient if it directs the attention of the appellate court to the particular error about
which the question is made, with clear and specific record or transcript references. Questions
made as to several issues or findings relating to one ground of recovery or defense may be
combined in one assignment of error, if separate record or transcript references are made.").
15. Hart, 644 S.E.2d at 202, accord State v. Hart, 179 N.C. App. 30, 36-7, 633 S.E.2d 102,
106-07 (2006).
16. Hart, 633 S.E.2d at 107.
17. Hart, 644 S.E.2d at 202, accord Hart, 633 S.E.2d at 111-13 (Hunter, J., dissenting).
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that the "[d]efendant's failure to specifically reference Rule 701
should not subject his argument to dismissal."' 8 From this procedural
background, the Court sought to better explain Viar so it would no
longer be misapplied.
Prior to its Rule 10(c)(1) violation analysis, the Court addressed the
first issue of "whether the Court of Appeals may review an appeal if
there are any violations of the Rules. ."9 The Court noted that the
State-appellee failed to mention the appellant's rule violations, "but
that the court raised that issue on its own, which it is not required to
do."2 The opinion then began citing various, and extensive case law
concerning the "mandatory" nature of the Rules, and that "compliance with the Rules is required."'" Though rule violations may lead to
an appeal's dismissal, the Court quickly noted that dismissal is not the
sole remedy, and that Rule 25(b), 22 or Rule 34,23 may provide alternative sanctions, thereby, allowing an appellate court to hear an appeal
on its merits.24 After explaining the legal underpinnings surrounding
Rule violations, the Court began its clarification of Viar.
Relying on its decisions from Steingress v. Steingress, 5 Viar,26 State
v. Buchanan, 7 and Munn v. North Carolina State University, 8 the
Court began its analysis of past cases where appeals were dismissed
for rule violations. 9 From Steingress, the Court relied on the language
18. Hart, 633 S.E. 2d at 111 (Hunter, J., dissenting).
19. Hart, 644 S.E.2d at 202.
20. Id.at 202.
21. Id. (citing Reep v. Beck, 360 N.C. 34, 38, 619 S.E.2d 497, 500 (2005) (quoting State v.
Fennell, 307 N.C. 258, 261-62, 297 S.E.2d 393, 396 (1982) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)); Pruitt v. Wood, 199 N.C. 788, 156 S.E. 126, 127 (1930) (citing Calvert v. Carstarphen,
133 N.C. 25, 45 S.E. 353 (1903)); Viar v. N.C. Dep't of Transp., 359 N.C. at 400; Steingress v.
Steingress, 350 N.C 64, 65-66, 511 S.E.2d 298, 299 (1999)).
22. N.C. R. App. P. 25(B) ("A court of the appellate division may, on its own initiative or
motion of a party, impose a sanction against a party or attorney or both when the court determines that such party or attorney or both substantially failed to comply with these appellate
rules. The court may impose sanctions of the type and in the manner prescribed by Rule 34 for
frivolous appeals.").
23. N.C. R. App. P. 34(A)-(B) ("(a) A court of the appellate division may, on its own initiative or motion of a party, impose a sanction against a party or attorney or both when the court
determines that an appeal or any proceeding in an appeal was frivolous ...(b) A court of the
appellate division may impose one or more of the following sanctions: (1) dismissal of the appeal; (2) monetary damages including, but not limited to, a. single or double costs, b. damages
occasioned by delay, c. reasonable expenses, including reasonable attorney fees, incurred because of the frivolous appeal or proceeding; (3) any other sanction deemed just and proper.")
24. Hart, 644 S.E.2d at 202.
25. Steingress, 350 N.C. 64, 511 S.E.2d 298.
26. Viar, 610 S.E.2d 360.
27. State v. Buchanan, 170 N.C. App. 692, 613 S.E.2d 356 (2005).
28. Munn v. N.C. State Univ., 360 N.C. 353, 626 S.E.2d 270 (2006) (per curiam) rev'd 173
N.C. App. 144, 617 S.E.2d 335 (2005).
29. Hart, 644 S.E.2d at 202-03.
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"that mandatory rules will subject an appeal to dismissal."3 Expanding upon the language in Steingress, the Court then noted its recent decision in Viar, where the Court admonished the Court of
Appeals for ruling on "issues not raised or argued by the plaintiff," by
its invocation of Rule 2.31 The Court then turned to Buchanan where
it determined that the Court of Appeals incorrectly held that the appellant's failure to adhere to the rules mandated dismissal under the
Viar rubric even though Buchanan had not been decided by the Supreme Court, nor was its analysis at issue in Hart.3 2 Buchanan, however, is important in Hart because of its application in Munn where
Judge Jackson's dissent, which cited Buchanan as controlling law,3 3
was ultimately adopted by the Court in reversing the lower court.3 4
The Hart Court is clear that while the Munn dissent correctly dismissed the appellant's appeal: "[W]e did not intend to adopt the
Buchanan analysis cited therein., 35 Analyzing the various opinions
about rule violations allowed the Court to reach its conclusion on the
issue of whether rule violations automatically required dismissal.
To alleviate the discrepancies, and in so doing, conclude that not all
rule violations require automatic dismissal, the Court wrote that,
"when this Court said an appeal is "subject to" dismissal for rules violations, it did not mean that an appeal shall be dismissed for any violation. ' 36 Furthermore, the Court held that "to the extent ... Steingress,
Viar, and Munn... require dismissal in every case in which there is' 37a
violation of the Rules ... we expressly disavow this interpretation.
Determining that rule violations do not amount to automatic dismissal
allowed the Court to then address the second issue.3 8
The second issue before the Court was "whether the majority correctly concluded that defendant violated Rule 10(c)(1)" when assigning error to the police officer's testimony.3 9 In addition to citing
the majority's rationale that the appellant's fourth assignment was too
broad; the Court further noted that "defendant presented a different
legal argument before the Court of Appeals, namely that the lay opinion testimony regarding the alleged 'crack pipe' should not have been
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
ity" as:
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 202 (citing Steingress, 511 S.E.2d at 299).
Hart, 644 S.E.2d at 202 (citing Viar, 610 S.E.2d at 361).
Hart, 644 S.E.2d at 203.
Munn, 617 S.E.2d at 339 (Jackson, J. dissenting).
Munn, 626 S.E.2d at 271.
Hart, 644 S.E.2d at 203.
Id. (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1466 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "subject to liabilsusceptible to a lawsuit)).
Hart, 644 S.E.2d at 203.
Id. at 204.
Id.
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admitted because the testimony violated Rule [of Evidence] 701. " 40
The Court then affirmed the majority's conclusion that Rule 10(c)(1)
had been violated, which left one more issue for the Court to decide.4 1
Having found the defendant's appeal violated the Rules, but that
this violation would not automatically subject his case to dismissal, the
Court then commenced its analysis of when an appellate court should
invoke Rule 2.42 Because the Court of Appeals used Viar to justify its
non-application of Rule 2, the Supreme Court quickly noted that "the
Viar holding does not mean that the Court of Appeals can no longer
apply Rule 2 at all," which reversed "this portion of the majority
opinion."4 3
Expanding upon this conclusion, the Court referenced the two circumstances when Rule 2 may be invoked, but held that this decision
rested solely "in the discretion of the Court" hearing the appeal."
Quoting Steingress, "we reaffirm that Rule 2 relates to the residual
power of our appellate courts to consider, in exceptional circumstances, significant issues of importance in the public interest, or to
prevent injustice which appears manifest to the Court, and only in
such instances."4 5 The Court then held that using Rule 2 to alter or
suspend the Rules "should only be undertaken with a view toward the
greater object of the rules."46
Delineating from this broader legal theory, the Court wrote that
when "substantial rights of an appellant are affected," then typically a
manifest injustice has occurred to that party which would enable a
tribunal's invocation of Rule 2." The Court explained that while Rule
2 has been applied in civil cases, its more common use has been in
criminal cases involving "severe punishments."4 8 The opinion emphasized that prior to suspending the Rules to prevent a "manifest injustice," an appellate court must understand and be ready to explain why
that drastic step is necessary in conjunction with the "fundamental
fairness and the predictable operation of the courts for which our
Rules of Appellate Procedure were designed."4 9 In keeping with this
principle, the Court explains that federal habeas courts will be less
likely to disregard the Rules.50 "Thus, if the Rules are not applied
40. Id.

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id.
Id. at 204-05.
Id. at 205.
Id.
Id. (quoting Steingress, 511 S.E.2d at 299-300.).
Hart, 644 S.E.2d at 205.
Id.

48. Id.

49. Id. at 206.
50. Id.
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consistently and uniformly, federal habeas tribunals could potentially

conclude that the Rules are not an adequate and independent state
ground barring review," resulting in the Rules' purpose and effect becoming moot. 5 1 In conclusion, the Court remanded Hart to the Court
of Appeals for determination on whether to invoke Rule 2, and disregard the Rule 10(c)(1) violation, and if it chooses to do so, whether

sanctions should be assessed against the violating attorney pursuant to
Rule 25 or Rule 34.52
BACKGROUND

A.

Application of Rule 2 Prior To Viar

One of the leading precedent cases surrounding appellate rule violations and the attempted application of Rule 2 is Steingress. Steingress

came to the Court as a matter of right following "a divided panel of
the Court of Appeals," which chose to not invoke Rule 2, thereby,
dismissing the appellant's appeal. 3 Initially, the appeal was based
upon a district court's equitable distribution order in a divorce proceeding.5 4 The issue, however, was not whether the district court's de-

cision was correct, but whether the Court of Appeals choice to not
invoke Rule 2, and hear the merits of the case despite the defendantappellant's failure to comply with Rules 26(g)(1) 55 and 28(b)(5) 56 was
an abuse of its discretion.57
In a 4-3 decision, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals deci-

sion. 8 Citing mandatory precedent, the Steingress Court began its
opinion by stating that, "[T]he appellate courts of this state have long
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Steingress, 511 S.E.2d at 298.
54. Id.
55. N.C. R. App. P. 26(c)(1) ("Papers presented to either appellate court for filing shall be
letter size (8 1/2 x 11) . . . All printed matter must appear in at least 12-point type on unglazed
white paper of 16-20 pound substance so as to produce a clear, black image, leaving a margin of
approximately one inch on each side. The body of text shall be presented with double spacing
between each line of text. No more than 27 lines of double-spaced text may appear on a page,
even if proportional type is used. Lines of text shall be no wider than 6 1/2 inches. The format of
all papers presented for filing shall follow the additional instructions found in the Appendixes to
these Appellate Rules.").
56. N.C. R. App. P. 28(B)(5) ("An appellant's brief in any appeal shall contain, under appropriate headings, and in the form prescribed by Rule 26(g) and the Appendixes to these rules,
in the following order: A full and complete statement of the facts. This should be a non-argumentative summary of all material facts underlying the matter in controversy which are necessary to understand all questions presented for review, supported by references to pages in the
transcript of proceedings, the record on appeal, or exhibits, as the case may be.").
57. Steingress, 511 S.E.2d at 298.
58. Id. at 300 ("[W]e cannot say that there was any abuse of discretion with respect to the
application of Rule 2, and we therefore conclude that the opinion of the Court of Appeals
should be ...

affirmed.").
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and consistently held that the rules of appellate practice, now designated the Rules of Appellate Procedure, are mandatory and that failure to follow these rules will subject an appeal to dismissal."5 9 The
opinion explained that the appellant's failure to double space her brief
and not provide page references to her assignments of error constituted a rule violation, and it was a matter of the Court of Appeals'
discretion to refuse to hear the appeal on its merits.6" While the appellant's appeal was dismissed, the Court, in dicta, "reaffirm[ed] that
Rule 2 relates to the residual power of our appellate courts to consider, in exceptional circumstances, significant issues of importance in
the public interest, or to prevent injustice which appears manifest to
the Court and only in such instances."'" Along the same logic, and
resulting in the same conclusion as the dissent at the Court of Appeals, the dissenting justices at the Supreme Court would have applied
62
Rule 2 and heard the appeal despite its technical deficiencies.
Writing for the Court's minority, Justice Frye first analyzed the
plain language of the Rules, which the appellant violated. 63 In addition to referencing these Rules, the dissent gave added attention to
the monetary sanctions elucidated under Rule 34 for frivolous appeals.6 4 Moreover, the dissent admonished the Court of Appeals for
its failure to consider penalizing the attorney pursuant to Rule 25(b)
65
governing "substantial failure to comply with the appellate rules."
Though the dissent offered case law 6 6 rebutting the majority's contention "that failure to follow the appellate rules has consistently subjected an appeal to dismissal" 67 ; its main rationale in remanding the
case to the Court of Appeals hinged on applying appropriate sanctions pursuant to Rules 25 and 34 rather than dismissing the appeal in
its entirety.6" While the dissent's argument was well reasoned in both
59. Id. at 299.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 299-300.
62. Id. at 300-02 (Frye, J., dissenting, with whom Parker, J., and Orr, J., concur).
63. Id. at 300-01.
64. Id. at 300-01.
65. Id. at 301.
66. Id. at 301-02 (citing State v. Glenn, 333 N.C. 296, 306, 425 S.E.2d 688, 695 (1993) (holding that certain assignments of error were deemed waived for failure to comply with Rule 28(d),
but not dismissing the appeal); see Jim Walter Corp v. Gilliam, 260 N.C. 211, 213, 132 S.E.2d 313,
315 (1963) (reviewing the record despite numerous violations of the General Statutes and Rules
of Practice in the Supreme Court, but affirming the trial court's dismissal of the appeal for failure to timely serve the case on appeal); see also State v. Newton, 207 N.C. 323, 326, 177 S.E. 184,
187 (1934) (reviewing the record despite defendant's violation of Rule 28 and finding no prejudicial or reversible error)).
67. Id. at 301.
68. Id. at 302 ("[Tlhey [the sanctioning rules] do provide a procedure whereby the offending party is afforded the opportunity to show cause why this most drastic sanction should not be
imposed.").
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its application of the Rules, and the case law surrounding the Rules,

the majority's holding subjecting appeals to dismissal for rule defects
became the law, and a pertinent aspect of the Viar holding.6 9
B.

The Viar Decision and Its Impact on Applying Rule 2
As noted before, Viar is the case Hart sought to clarify following the

confusion after its publishing. Unlike many of the cases cited in this
note, Viar was an appeal from the Industrial Commission, which is
statutorily vested7" with deciding tort claims arising against the State,
and/or one of its agencies. 7' The tort action was commenced against
the N.C. Department of Transportation for the Department's alleged

negligence in failing to construct proper barricades on state maintained highways; the plaintiff's two daughters were killed when their
car crossed a median and was then struck by a tractor-trailer.7 2
Though the Industrial Commission dismissed the plaintiff's claim, a
divided Court of Appeals overturned this decision after invoking Rule
2. 7 Judge Tyson's dissent in the Court of Appeals allowed the case to
reach the Supreme Court as a matter of right.74 The issue became
whether the Court should adopt Tyson's dissent for the appellant's
violation of Rules 10(c)(1) 75 and 28(b)(6), 76 thereby, overturning
69. Viar, 610 S.E.2d at 360.
2

70. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143- 91(A) (2005) "TORT CLAiMS Acr" ("The North Carolina In-

dustrial Commission is hereby constituted a court for the purpose of hearing and passing upon
tort claims against ... the Board of Transportation, and all other departments, institutions and
agencies of the State. The Industrial Commission shall determine whether or not each individual
claim arose as a result of the negligence of any officer, employee, involuntary servant or agent of
the State while acting within the scope of his office, employment, service, agency or authority,
under circumstances where the State of North Carolina, if a private person, would be liable to
the claimant in accordance with the laws of North Carolina.").
71. Viar, 610 S.E.2d at 360.
72. Viar v. N.C. Dept. of Transp., 162 N.C. App. 362, 590 S.E.2d 909, 911 (2004), overruled
by Viar, 610 S.E.2d at 360.
73. See Viar, 590 S.E.2d at 913 ("In the instant case, we conclude that the Industrial Commission's legal conclusions are based upon erroneous application of the law to the facts, and are
not supported by its findings of facts."); see also 590 S.E.2d at 919 ("[Tjhe record here is not
lengthy, nor are the issues complicated. The violations are technical rather than substantive, and
are not so egregious as to warrant dismissal." The Court of Appeals invoked Rule 2 on this
rationale.).
74. Viar, 610 S.E.2d at 360.
75. See supra note 14, at 3, providing the complete language of N.C. R. App. P. 10(c)(1).
76. N.C. R. App. P. 28(B)(6) ("An appellant's brief in any appeal shall contain, under appropriate headings, and in the form prescribed by Rule 26(g) and the Appendixes to these rules,
in the following order: An argument, to contain the contentions of the appellant with respect to
each question presented. Each question shall be separately stated. Immediately following each
question shall be a reference to the assignments of error pertinent to the question, identified by
their numbers and by the pages at which they appear in the printed record on appeal. Assignments of error not set out in the appellant's brief, or in support of which no reason or argument
is stated or authority cited, will be taken as abandoned.").
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the 7Court
of Appeals decision, and precluding the plaintiff's recov7
ery.
In a per curiam opinion, the Court not only adopted Tyson's dissent
in its entirety, but also elucidated its own rationale in admonishing the
majority's application of Rule 2.78 Because of the Court's ratification

of Tyson's dissent, it is necessary to illustrate that dissent prior to delving into the Court's opinion.
Prior to any analysis, the dissent's first step was to set forth that
while the appellant's case should be dismissed for non-compliance
with the Rules, the appeal could, in the alternative, be dismissed because the Industrial Commission correctly applied the facts to the applicable law.7 9 The opinion rebutted the majority's Rule 2 invocation
by citing not only to the Rules, but also to case law supporting Tyson's
findings.80 Specifically, Rules 10(a),8 1 10(c)(3), 8 2 28 (a), 8 3 and
28(b)(6) 84 were cited as being transgressed in his opposition.85 First,

the opinion notes that the appellant's failure to number his assignments of error violated Rule 10(a), which sets out that only those assignments preserved in the record may be argued in the brief.8 6 Next,
the dissent found that the plaintiff had committed not one, but two

Rule 10(c)(3) violations.8 7 The opinion remarked that, "since plaintiff

failed to assert error to any of the Commission's findings of fact, the
Commission's findings are binding on our Court and we must conclude they are supported by competent evidence." 8 8 Not only were no

errors asserted to the Commission's findings of fact, but also, no attri77. Viar, 610 S.E.2d at 360.
78. Id.
79. Viar, 590 S.E.2d at 920 (Tyson, J. dissenting).
80. Id. at 920-22.
81. N.C. R. App. P. 10(a) ("The scope of review on appeal is confined to a consideration of
those assignments of error set out in the record on appeal...").
82. N.C. R. App. P. 10(c)(3) ("In civil cases, questions that the evidence is legally or factually insufficient to support a particular issue or finding, and challenges directed against any conclusions of law of the trial court based upon such issues or findings, may be combined under a
single assignment of error raising both contentions if the record references and the argument
under the point sufficiently direct the court's attention to the nature of the question made regarding
each such issue or finding or legal conclusion based thereon.") (emphasis added).
83. N.C. R. App. P. 28(a) ("Review is limited to questions so presented in the several
briefs. Questions raised by assignments of error in appeals from trial tribunals but not then
presented and discussed in a party's brief, are deemed abandoned ...").
84. N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(6) ("Each question shall be separately stated. Immediately following each question shall be a reference to the assignments of error pertinent to the question,
identified by their numbers and by the pages at which they appear in the printed record on
appeal ...").
85. Viar, 590 S.E.2d at 920-22.
86. Id. at 920.
87. Id. at 921.
88. Id. (citing Koufman v. Koufman, 330 N.C. 93, 97, 408 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1991)).
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bution was given to the record, which further violates Rule 10(c)(3). 89
Violations of Rules 10(a) and 10(c)(3) relate to the plaintiff's deficiencies surrounding the assignments of error made in the record,
whereas, the Rule 28(a) and 28(b)(6) violations concern the plaintiff's
argument in the appellate brief itself.9"
Particularly, the dissent focused on the appellant's citation to the
Commission's minority opinion as opposed to its majority. 91 Judge Tyson explains that "citing only to the dissenting opinion violates the
appellate rules and is insufficient to identify 'the pages at which [the
assignments of error] appear in the printed record on appeal'," and
therefore, runs afoul of Rule 28(b)(6).92 Furthermore, the plaintiff's
brief contained only one question presented, which was argued before
the Court of Appeals, and this question presented did not correlate to
the first assignment of error made in the record. 93 The dissent reasoned that because there was no homogeny between these two sections, the argument was abandoned for violating Rule 28(a).94
Concluding his discussion of the appellant's rule violations Judge Tyson wrote, "not only did plaintiff improperly make assignments of error, but he also failed to properly argue the portions assigned as error.
This appeal is not properly before us and should be dismissed." 95
There is no indication whether, individually, one of these violations
would have subjected the appeal to dismissal; however, it appears
from the dissent that when one technicality is coupled with other unrelated violations, then the dismissal option may become more
ominous.
Adding to Judge Tyson's dissent, the Court explained that the Court
of Appeals majority erred because it "addressed the issue, not raised
or argued by plaintiff, which was the basis of the Industrial Commission's decision, namely, the reasonableness of defendant's decision to
delay installation of the median barriers." 96 In dismissing the appeal in
accord with Tyson's dissent, the Court held that, "It was not the role
of the appellate courts, however, to create an appeal for an appel89. Viar, 590 S.E.2d at 921
90. Id. (explaining that Rule 28(a) and 28(b)(6) deficiencies occurred at the 'Questions
Presented' section of the brief, and the Rule 10(a) and 10(c)(3) violations occurred in the 'Assignments of Error' found in the record on appeal).
91. Id.
92. Id. (quoting N.C. R. App. P. 28(6)).
93. Viar, 590 S.E.2d at 921. ("Plaintiff's brief does not address the Commission's failure to
admit certain deposition testimony from other cases as set forth as error in the first assignment
of error.").
94. Id. at 921-22.
95. ld. at 922.
96. N.C. Dep't of Transp., 359 N.C. 400, 610 S.E.2d 360, 361 (2005).
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lant." 97 This is the holding, which took center stage before the Court
in Hart following misapplications in the Court of Appeals.9 8
C.

Misapplicationof Rule 2 Cases Following Viar
Munn was not only one of the most important cases construing Viar

to mean that Rule violations must result in an appeal's dismissal, but
also, Hartexpressly cited Munn when disavowing the notion that Rule

violations automatically mandate dismissal. 99 In Munn, the dispute
arose over an employment contract. The defendant cancelled the
plaintiff's phased-retirement agreement after two unrelated sexual
harassment complaints were lodged against the plaintiff by two of his

students. 100 At trial, the jury awarded the plaintiff nominal damages of
$1.00 instead of the $43,228.00, alleged.' The trial court denied the
plaintiff's JNOV motion and motion for a new trial on damages for

the jury's nominal damages award. The plaintiff then appealed the
court's denial of these motions.'0 2 After succinctly referencing the

plaintiff-appellant's Rule violations, 10 3 a divided Court of Appeals re-

versed the trial court's denial, however, in an appeal of right; the Supreme Court, in a per curiam decision, reversed the Court of Appeals
and adopted Judge Jackson's dissent. 104

The issue in Judge Jackson's dissent became whether the plaintiff's

violation of Rules 10(c)(1)' °5 and 10(c)(2) 106 should subject his appeal
to dismissal.0 7 Specifically, the dissent finds that "plaintiff makes no
attempt to direct the attention of this Court to any portion of the record on appeal or to the transcript with any references thereto,"
amounting to a Rule 10(c)(1) violation. 8 Additionally, the dissent
notes the plaintiff did not properly preserve his objections to the jury
97. Id.
98. Hart, 644 S.E.2d at 202.
99. Id. at 203.
100. Munn v. N.C. State Univ., 173 N.C. App. 144, 617 S.E. 2d 335 (2005).
101. Id. at 337.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 338. ("The dissent argues, however, that this case should not be remanded because plaintiff neither objected to nor assigned error to the jury instructions.").
104. Munn v. N.C. State Univ., 360 N.C. 353, 354, 626 S.E. 2d 270, 271 (2006).
105. N.C. R. APP. P. 10(c)(1).
106. N.C. R. APP. P. 10(c)(2) ("Where a question concerns instructions given to the jury, the
party shall identify the specific portion of the jury charge in question by setting it within brackets
or by any other clear means of reference in the record on appeal. A question of the failure to
give particular instructions to the jury, or to make a particular finding of fact or conclusion of
law which finding or conclusion was not specifically requested of the trial judge, shall identify the
omitted instruction, finding or conclusion by setting out its substance in the record on appeal
immediately following the instructions given, or findings or conclusions made.").
107. Munn v. N.C. State Univ., 173 N.C. App. 144, 617 S.E. 2d 335 (2005) (Jackson, J.
dissenting).
108. Id.
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instructions at trial, nor did he properly do so in his actual appeal
pursuant to Rule 10(c)(2), which provides specific instructions for appeals concerning jury instructions."°9 Quoting the Buchanan holding,

Jackson justified her dismissal of the appeal for non-compliance with

the Rules." ° Eventually, Hartclarified the Court's per curiam acceptance of Jackson's dissent noting that Buchanan was not the proper
precedent; however, Munn's appeal had already been dismissed following the misapplication of Viar in Buchanan.'1 '
D.

Application of Rule 2 Following Hart

One month after the publication of Hart, a divided Court of Appeals published its opinion in Dogwood, which heavily cited Hart both
in the majority, and the dissent." 2 At trial, the trial court denied the
defendant's JNOV motion, which the defendant hoped would overturn the jury's verdict finding that the defendant breached its contract
with the plaintiff."l 3 On appeal, the plaintiff-appellee filed a motion to
dismiss defendant's appeal for violating Rules 10(c)(1), 1 14 28(b)(6), "t 5
and 28(b)(4)," 6 which the majority granted.1 17 Because of Hart, the
issue before the Court of Appeals became "whether or not to invoke
and apply Rule 2 ...to excuse defendant's appellate rule violations
and review the merits of its appeal.""'
After a brief analysis of Hart, the majority sought to distinguish
Dogwood from Hart to rationalize its non-application of Rule 2.119
First, the opinion brought attention to the fact that despite the appellant's ability to amend its appeal to correct technical flaws following
120
the appellee's motion to dismiss, the appellant still failed to do so.
Specifically, in reference to Hart,the court noted that Dogwood was a
109. Id. at 340.
110. Id. at 339 (quoting State v. Buchanan, 170 N.C. App. 692 ,693, 613 S.E.2d 356, 357
(2005) ("Our Supreme Court has stated that this Court may not review an appeal that violates
the Rules of Appellate Procedure even though such violations neither impede our comprehension of the issues nor frustrate the appellate process." (citing Viar v. N.C. Dep't of Transp., 359
N.C. 400, 610 S.E.2d 360-61(2005))).
111. See State v. Hart, 361 N.C. 309, 313, 644 S.E.2d 201, 202 (2007) ... we did not intend
to adopt the Buchanan analysis cited therein.").
112. Dogwood Dev. & Mgmt. Co. v. White Oak Transp. Co., 645 S.E.2d 212 (N.C. Ct. App.
2007) (referencing Hart a total of roughly ten times).
113. Id. at 214.
114. N.C. R. App. P. 10(c)(1).
115. N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(6) ("The argument shall contain a concise statement of the applicable standard(s) of review for each question presented .. ).
116. N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(4) ("A statement of grounds for appellate review. Such statement
shall include citation of the statute or statutes permitting appellate review.. .
117. Dogwood, 645 S.E.2d at 214-16.
118. Id. at 217.
119. Id. at 216-17.
120. Id. at 217.
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civil action as opposed to the criminal indictment in Hart.121 Additionally, in Dogwood, "[T]here are multiple and egregious rule violations instead of one violation as in Hart.' 22 Though Hart clarified
Viar, the majority still applied Viar to reject the dissent's argument
that monetary sanctions would be a more suitable remedy than dismissal. t2 3 In conclusion, the Court chose not to invoke Rule 2 because, "No showing [was] made and the record [did] not indicate any
reasons to justify the Court's invocation of its discretionary power
under Appellate Rule 2," and ultimately,
dismissed the appeal for the
1 24
defendant's numerous rule violations.
Applying Hart, Judge Hunter's dissenting opinion in Dogwood
reads Hart as reminding "this Court that exercising our discretion to
overlook rules violations pursuant to Rule 2 is not our only option
when confronted with those violations." 12' Like the Steingress dissent,
the dissent here suggests that Rules 25 and 34 sufficiently cover permissible monetary sanctions against attorneys who violate the rules,
1 26
while still allowing for those appeals to be heard on the merits.
Along a similar rationale, the dissent implored the Court to realize
that "Doling out dismissals without consideration of their type or degree is a too simplistic method of enforcing the appellate rules and
ignores the discretion those rules give this Court."'1 27 The dissent's
holding combined these two principles and found that "when rules
violations do not impede an evaluation of the case on its merits,"
monetary penalties should be assessed against the offending attorney
rather than dismissing the appeal outright.128 Applying this standard,
Judge Hunter concludes that "[R]ather than dismissing the case ...' 29I
impose monetary sanctions.'

would hear the case on its merits and
Judge Hunter's dissent in this case allows it to be decided by the Supreme Court, however, the Court has not published an opinion on the
matter.

121. Id. at 216-17 ("Although this Court has exercised Rule 2 in civil cases.. the Court has
done so more frequently in the criminal context when severe punishments were imposed."
(quoting Hart, 361 N.C. at 315, 644 S.E.2d at 205).
122. Dogwood, 645 S.E.2d at 217.
123. Id. ("It is not the role of the appellate courts, however, to create an appeal for an
appellant.") (quoting Viar, 359 N.C. at 400, 610 S.E.2d at 361 (2005)).
124. Dogwood, 645 S.E.2d at 217.
125. Id. (Hunter, J. dissenting).
126. Id. at 218.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 219.
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ANALYSIS

The development of case law surrounding Rule 2 precedes the
benchmark Steingress case, and, as Dogwood illustrates, this development will not end with Hart. Hart, however, does provide some insight into how the current Court will analyze future Rule 2 cases due
to its recency. Though Hart provides clarity to Rule 2, after the
opaque Viar decision, the Court must address certain issues that were
not addressed in Hart, so the various Court of Appeals panels, and
practitioners in general, will have better guidance so the confusion following Viar will not be repeated.
It is rare to find an opinion, which alleviates all issues in a particular
case or legal area, but arguably most opinions do provide some remedies to the situation. Hart is no different. Although Hart does not set
forth an explicit black letter rule of law, the decision sufficiently corrected the misapplication of Rule 2 following Viar. Namely, the
Court's authoritative position that Viar in no way suggested that Rule
2 could never be applied when a party violates one of the appellate
rules, but that the stance taken in Viar was limited to circumstances
where an appellate court invoked Rule 2 creating an appeal for the
appellant when an appeal did not otherwise exist. Moreover, the
Court opined that while an appellate court could invoke Rule 2 and
hear a case on its merits, it should be done so within the considerations enunciated in Hart.
Though the Court failed to explain whether one of the four factors
it listed would automatically halt a court's Rule 2 analysis, it appears
that if a court can explain its decision to use Rule 2 with all four factors then its decision will most likely be upheld. First, the Court cautioned that the application of Rule 2 is an extreme measure, which
should be reserved only for rare circumstances. Next, the Court further limited application to only those two situations covered by Rule 2
itself. Adding to this line of jurisprudence, the Court reminded the
two appellate divisions that unless the Rules are applied "consistently
and uniformly" with "fundamental fairness and the predictable operation of the courts" as the two key components then a federal court
could choose not to give the Rules deference; therefore, subjecting the
Rules to an interpretation not intended, or wanted by North Carolina
courts.1 3 ° With these considerations in mind, the Court emphasized
that if an appellate court chose to adopt Rule 2 then it "should only '1be
31
undertaken with a view toward the greater object of the rules.'
This four-step analysis, on its face, is made better by the definition
130. Hart, 644 S.E.2d at 206.
131. Id. at 205.
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given to "manifest injustice." However, the Court fell short on this
point because it failed to also define what a 'decision in the public
interest' would entail. While Hart notably omitted defining the second basis for a court's exercising Rule 2, it does not negate the effectiveness of the rule's overall analysis, which did set an appropriate
standard for applying Rule 2.
Realizing that Rule 2 would basically be used only as a means to
hear cases despite technical deficiencies in a party's appeal, the Court
emphasized that the Rules do provide for monetary sanctions for violations of the Rules. In certain instances, such as if Rule 2 were invoked, those remedies would be appropriate against the offending
attorney who violated the Rules, but would still allow that attorney's
client to have his or her case heard on the merits. Applying monetary
sanctions was the position advocated in the respective dissents of both
Steingress and Dogwood and it appears that now such a remedy may
be better received if an appeal on that issue were to make it to the
Court. The Court must be careful, however, that it does not fall down
the slippery slope of allowing too many meritorious cases with substantial technical deficiencies to be heard while simply applying monetary sanctions. A balance between the severity of a case's Rule
violations and application of Rule 2 with subsequent monetary penalties assessed against an offending lawyer must be found. Hart does
well to begin this inquiry, but it appears that Hart could be easily distinguishable from other cases that come to the Court.
It is foreseeable that one could distinguish Hart from a future case
with relative ease. First, Hart dealt with only one Rule violation,
whereas the other cases illustrated in this note had multiple violations.
This is important because it is more likely that an appellate court
would be willing to disregard one rule violation as opposed to numerous violations that make it more difficult to comprehend the issue[s]
on appeal. Furthermore, Hart involved a habitual criminal defendant
who received a severe punishment for his offenses as opposed to the
appellant in Munn, for instance, who took issue with the verdict from
his civil breach of contract case. It makes sense that an appellate
court would be more willing to show leniency pursuant to Rule 2 when
a person's freedom is on the line than when a person has a contract
breached against him. These two distinguishing characteristics could
work against the Hart framework, therefore, it is imperative that the
Court maintain the same rationale in future Rule 2 cases it decides.
CONCLUSION

The two legal principles enunciated in State v. Hart give guidance to
appellate courts. First, the Court determined that Viar had been mishttps://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol30/iss2/6
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applied when courts automatically dismissed appeals based upon Rule
violations. Second, Hart reaffirmed that Rule 2 could be invoked in
certain circumstances. Though Hart was explicitly more lenient than
Viar, the Court carefully noted that the decision to invoke Rule 2
should not be taken arbitrarily, and that a court must provide a thorough analysis of the situation to justify its application.
Furthermore, Hart represents the premise that, while Rule 2 should
be applied cautiously, the court of appeals may hear a case on its
merits despite an attorney's negligent or reckless disregard of the
Rules. In so doing, it appears that the long-standing legal principle of
not imputing an attorney's negligence to the client, which here would
entail the client's case being dismissed for an action he or she could
not otherwise control - attorney's Rule violation(s) - then it should
not prohibit that client from having his case heard on the merits.132 In
closing, Hart begins the necessary steps of reconciling the hard-line
stance taken in Viar with the need to ensure justice is served, while
also realizing that "the rules are not merely ritualistic formalisms, but
are essential to our ability to ascertain the merits of an appeal. Furthermore, the appellate rules promote fairness by alerting both the
Court and appellee
to the specific errors appellant ascribes to the
33
court below." 1

132. See generally Gaster v. Goodwin, 263 N.C. 441, 443, 139 S.E.2d 716. 717(1965). ("[l1f a
judgment is obtained due to the negligent failure of the attorney to appear and defend the cause
when called for trial, the client may have the judgment set aside for surprise and excusable
neglect.").
133. Shook v. County of Buncombe, 125 N.C. App. 284, 480 S.E.2d 706, 707 (1997).
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